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Abstract 
Motivated by VAR evidence on the risk-taking channel in the US, we develop a New Keynesian 
model where low levels of the risk-free rate induce banks to grant credit to riskier borrowers. In the 
model an agency problem between depositors and equity holders incentivizes banks to take 
excessive risk. As the real interest rate declines these incentives become stronger and risk taking 
increases. We estimate the model on US data using Bayesian techniques and assess optimal 
monetary policy conduct in the estimated model, assuming that the interest rate is the only available 
instrument. Our results suggest that in a risk taking channel environment, the monetary authority 
should seek to stabilize the path of the real interest rate, trading off more inflation volatility in 
exchange for less interest rate and output volatility.  
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has marked the importance of monitoring the di↵erent types of risks
to which the financial sector, and ultimately the real economy, are exposed. A relevant aspect
is whether interest rates, and therefore monetary policy, can influence the risk-taking behavior
of financial intermediaries. This transmission mechanism, known as the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy,1 could have contributed to the excessive risk exposure of the financial sector
in the lead-up to the 2008 crisis. In the aftermath of the financial crisis interest rates have
fallen to their zero lower bound in many countries, raising concerns on whether financial market
participants might be once again induced to reallocate portfolios towards riskier investments,
creating the risk of yet another crisis.2
Motivated by the empirical finding that expansionary monetary policy shocks persistently
increase bank asset risk in the US, we model bank asset risk taking in a DSGE framework and
assess how monetary policy should be conducted in the presence of a risk-taking channel. Building
on Dell’Ariccia et al. [2014], we assume that banks can choose from a continuum of investment
projects, each defined by di↵erent risk-return characteristics. Since depositors cannot observe
this choice, and because bank owners are protected by limited liability, an agency problem
emerges: banks are partially isolated from the downside risk of the investment and hence choose
a risk level that exceeds what would be chosen if these frictions were absent. With respect to
this latter benchmark case, excessive risk leads to ine ciently low levels of capital, output and
consumption. Furthermore, we show that lower levels of the real risk-free rate induce banks to
choose even riskier investments.
This connection between interest rates and the risk choice raises the question of whether
the monetary authority should take this channel into account when setting the interest rate.
Since the answer to this question is of quantitative nature, we embed our banking sector in a
medium scale Smets and Wouters [2007] type DSGE model, known to fit the data well along
many dimensions, and estimate it on US data. Using this model we then analyze optimal
monetary policy using simple rules. We find that, if the risk-taking channel is active, monetary
policy should be less responsive to inflation and output fluctuations. In this way, the monetary
authority allows more inflation volatility in exchange for stabilizing the real interest rate, which
in turn reduces the welfare detrimental volatility of the banks’ risk choice. The welfare gains
from taking the risk-taking channel into account are significant.
Our work relates to a small but growing theoretical literature that links monetary policy to
financial sector risk in a general equilibrium framework. Most of the existing works focus on
funding risk, associating risk with leverage, and build on the financial accelerator framework
of Bernanke et al. [1999].3 Angeloni and Faia [2013] and Angeloni et al. [2015] instead build
1The term was first coined by Borio and Zhu [2008].
2See for instance: (2014, 22 March). Staying Unconventional, The Economist.
3For example in Gertler et al. [2012] and de Groot [2014] a monetary expansion increases banking sector
leverage, which in turn amplifies the financial accelerator and strengthens the propagation of shocks to the real
economy.
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a model where higher leverage induced by expansionary monetary policy doesn’t just amplify
other shocks but also translates into a higher fraction of ine cient bank runs.
In this paper we model bank asset risk, another aspect of financial sector risk that could
have played a role in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis, but has not yet been explored in
the monetary policy literature. This link is analyzed in a micro model by Dell’Ariccia et al.
[2014], but their framework is not suitable to answer the policy questions addressed in this
paper. Ine cient asset risk-taking is modelled also in Collard et al. [2012], though ultimately
the financial regulator ensures that risk is always chosen optimally.4 Our paper on the contrary
abstracts from regulation as an additional tool and explores how monetary policy should be
conducted if the risk taking channel cannot be resolved (fully) through regulation.
The lack of theoretical papers on the asset risk taking channel is not mirrored by lack of
empirical evidence. On the contrary, several studies find a causal link between monetary policy
and risk taking. Most of the existing research relies on loan or bank level panel data and
identification is based on the assumption that monetary policy is exogenous. Jimenez et al. [2014]
use micro data of the Spanish Credit Register from 1984 to 2006 and find that lower interest
rates induce banks to make relatively more loans to firms that qualify as risky ex ante (firms
with a bad credit history at time of granting the loan) as well as ex post (firms that default on
the granted loan). They argue that this e↵ect is economically significant and particularly strong
for thinly capitalized banks. These findings are confirmed for Bolivia using credit register data
in Ioannidou et al. [2014] and for the US using confidential loan level data from the Terms of
Business Lending Survey in Dell’Ariccia et al. [2013].
Evidence based on aggregate, publicly available time series data, where identification is ob-
tained through restrictions on the dynamic responses, is less clear cut, not least because of limited
data availability. Buch et al. [2013] estimate a FAVAR on a large data set of US banking-sector
variables from the public summary data of the Terms of Business Lending Survey. They find that
an expansionary monetary policy shock induces small domestic banks to increase the fraction
of risky new loans to total new loans, but this evidence is not confirmed for the entire banking
system. Afanasyeva and Guentner [2015] show, using a similar FAVAR methodology, that a mon-
etary policy expansion decreases the net percentage of banks reporting tighter lending standards
in the Fed survey of business lending. This measure, which may be considered a possible proxy
for asset risk-taking, has not been found to be impacted by monetary policy in the empirical
analysis5 conducted in Angeloni et al. [2015]. We complement this result in the following section,
showing that further evidence of an asset risk-taking channel can be retrieved by using a more
direct measure of asset risk taking.
An interesting detail on the asset risk-taking channel is found in Buch et al. [2013] and
4Only in an extension do they briefly consider the possibility that monetary policy might have implications
for optimal regulation.
5Angeloni et al. (2015) use a recursive identification scheme on monthly US data between 1985 and 2008. They
test three di↵erent measures for risk: funding risk (leverage), asset risk (percentage of loan o cers reporting a
tightening of loan standards in the Fed survey of business lending) and overall risk (realized volatility of bank
stock prices). They find (lagged) significant positive e↵ects only for funding and overall risk.
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Ioannidou et al. [2014]. Both show that an increase in risk taking induced by low interest rates
is not accompanied by an o↵setting increase in the risk premium, indicating that the additional
risk taking is ine cient.
Motivated by this comprehensive empirical evidence and by our own VAR analysis in section
2, we develop in section 3 a DSGE model of asset risk-taking, where banks respond to low
interest rates by ine ciently taking more risk. Section 4 discusses the steady-state and dynamic
implications of bank risk taking in the estimated version of the model presented in section 3.
Section 5 analyses how monetary policy should be conducted if a risk-taking channel is present
and section 6 concludes.
2 The asset risk-taking channel in the US
In this section we provide additional empirical evidence on the existence of the asset risk-taking
channel in the US. Our starting point is a classical small scale VAR that includes inflation, output,
a measure of bank risk taking and the e↵ective federal funds rate, taken as the monetary policy
instrument. Output is measured by real GDP growth, while inflation is defined as the annualised
log change in the GDP deflator. Identification of the monetary policy shock is achieved through
sign restrictions that do not involve the measure of bank risk, and are in this sense agnostic.
We find that an unexpected decrease in the risk-free interest rate causes a persistent increase in
bank risk taking, a result robust to using a recursive identification scheme. Our positive findings
contradict the insignificance result on asset risk in Angeloni et al. [2015], whose specification is
identical apart from the risk measure used.6
Measuring bank risk-taking behaviour There are many notions of asset risk. One can
distinguish between ex-ante, ex-post and realized asset risk. The former is the risk perceived by
the bank when making a loan or buying an asset. Banks can influence this class of risk directly,
when making their investment decisions (the ex-ante risk choice). On the other hand, the ex-post
risk of a bank’s balance sheet is also a↵ected by unforeseen changes in asset riskiness, that take
place after origination and are largely outside the banks’ influence. Finally, both types of risk
together yield a certain stochastic return when the asset or a loan is due (materialized asset risk).
In this paper we focus on active risk taking, that is the level of ex-ante risk that intermediaries
choose. Ex-ante bank risk taking is however largely unobservable. Inferring it from materialized
risk (e.g. loan losses) is hardly possible with aggregate data. Inference from the spread between
some measure of bank funding costs and loan rates neglects the fact that this spread not only
reflects default risk but also incorporates a liquidity premium and the markup, which are likely
to be a↵ected by the same variables that influence the risk choice. Instead we use a survey based
6We believe that our measure of asset risk (weighted risk rating of new loans) is superior to theirs (percentage of
loan o cers reporting tightening of lending standards) in two ways: First, our measure provides level information
while their measure indicates only the direction of change in risk. Second, our measure is based on the quantity
and quality of loans granted (revealed preferences), whereas theirs is based on reported perceptions that are
aggregated to an index in an arbitrary way.
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proxy for bank risk-taking, which is provided by the US Terms of Business Lending Survey and
consists in the internal risk rating assigned by banks to newly issued loans. In this survey,
available only from 1997-Q1 onwards, 400 banks report the volume of loans originated in the
quarter prior to filling the survey, grouped by the internal risk rating. This rating varies between
1 and 5, with 5 being the maximum level of risk. Following Dell’Ariccia et al. [2014], we construct
a weighted average loan risk series, using as weights the value of loans in each risk category7.
We plot this measure of risk, together with the nominal risk-free interest rate, in figure 1. We
can see that low levels of the monetary policy instrument tend to be associated with higher level
of bank risk (lower or decreasing levels in the blue line). This is particularly evident in the
period between 2000 and 2006, when the monetary policy stance in the US was deemed to be
particularily lax.
An increase in risk at times of low interest rates can be caused either by worsened macroe-
conomic conditions, giving banks no other choice than making riskier loans on average, or by an
active choice of the banks to extend credit to riskier borrowers on average. We control for this
e↵ect, to the extent that it is reflected in inflation and output.
Figure 1: Bank risk taking and nominal interest rate: The risk measures (solid blue line, left axis) is
defined such that a decrease can be associated to a higher risk-taking behaviour of the banking sector. The
nominal interest rate (dashed line, right axis) is the e↵ective federal funds rate.
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Identification strategy and results We estimate a VAR on US data from 1997-Q1, the
start of the survey-based proxy for risk taking, to 2008:Q3, as described in appendix A8. The
lag length is chosen to be 1, as indicated by the BIC information criterion.
7The average loan risk is a perfect measure for bank risk taking if we assume that the volume of loans is
constant. Else, banks could also minimize their risk exposure by reducing the quantity of loans as their average
quality goes down. While the correlation between risk and loan volume growth is slightly negative, it is not
significant at 10%. For a more in-depth discussion of the data we refer to Buch et al. [2013].
8We have decided to cut the zero-lower bound period, but it should be noted that our results still hold also
when the latest available data are used.
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Table 1: Sign restriction identification scheme: restrictions are assumed to hold on impact and on the
following period.
variables
shock y ⇡ R
monetary policy shock + +  
total factor productivity shock +    
Figure 2: Monetary policy shock on bank risk-taking: Impulse responses over a 3-year horizon, identified
through the sign restriction scheme in Table 1. Error bands correspond to 68% (light grey area) and to 95% (dark
grey area) confidence intervals reflecting rotation uncertainty. The variable q ex-ante proxies the ex-ante safety
of banks’ assets and is defined as the inverse of the average loan risk rating. See text for further details.
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We identify an unexpected monetary policy shock by using a set of sign restrictions that
are robust across a variety of general-equilibrium models. In particular, we assume that an
expansionary monetary policy shock decreases the nominal risk-free interest rate, and increases
inflation and output, both at the time of the shock and in the quarter immediately after. Note
that the response of inflation ensures that this shock is identified separately from a productivity
shock, as summarised in table 1.
The response of bank asset risk to an expansionary monetary policy shock is shown in figure
2. An unexpected decrease in the monetary policy interest rate is followed by a moderate
macroeconomic expansion: output growth increases for less than a year, while inflation displays
a longer reaction of about two years. The results are also compatible with the existence of a
risk-taking channel in the US: a fall in the nominal interest rate leads in fact to a decrease in the
ex-ante proxy for the safety of banks’ assets, and thus to an increase in the risk rating the banks
attach to the loans in their portfolio. Interestingly, the implied responses of the real interest rate
and the risk measure are virtually proportional.
We assess the robustness of our results by employing a recursive identification scheme as in
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Angeloni et al. [2015] with two di↵erent variable orderings. Output and inflation are always
ordered before the nominal interest rate, implicitly assuming that they do not react to interest
rate shocks, nor to shocks coming from the banking sector. More controversial is the ordering
of the nominal interest rate and of the loan risk rating. We experiment with both orderings and
show in figure 4 in appendix B that results do not depend on the ordering chosen and confirm
the results obtained using sign restrictions9.
3 A Dynamic New Keynesian model with a bank risk-
taking channel
In this section we build a general-equilibrium model where monetary policy can influence the
risk-taking behaviour of banks, thus providing an explanation for the stylized facts observed in
the data. As a starting point we use a standard New Keynesian model with imperfect competition
and price stickiness in the goods market, which implies a role for monetary policy. We augment
this basic framework with an intermediation sector based on Dell’Ariccia et al. [2014]: competitive
banks obtain funds from depositors and equity holders, which they invest into capital projects
carried out by capital producers. Every bank chooses its investment from a continuum of available
capital production technologies, each defined by a given risk-return characteristic. The risk choice
of the representative bank is a↵ected by the level of the real interest rate, and can be shown to
be suboptimal. This model reproduces two features found in the data: risk taking depends on
the contemporaneous interest rate and is ine cient.
While the aforementioned blocks are the necessary ingredients, in order to obtain a quan-
titatively more realistic model we add further elements, which are typically used in the DSGE
literature. In particular we allow for internal habits, investment adjustment costs and imperfect
competition and wage stickiness in the labor market.Our model therefore features seven agents
that are typical for DSGE models (households, unions, labor packers, capital producers, inter-
mediate goods producers, final goods producers, central bank) and two agents that we introduce
to model risk taking (banks, funds). Seven structural shocks hit the economy: these a↵ect pro-
ductivity, investment, preferences, wage and price markups shock, as well as monetary and fiscal
policy. The complete set of equations that characterize the model can be found in appendix C.
3.1 Households
The representative household chooses consumption ct, working hours Lt and savings in order to
maximize its discounted lifetime utility U (ct, Lt). Saving is possible through three instruments:
government bonds st, deposit funds dt, and bank equity funds et. The return on government
9Our measure of risk taking does not take into account loan quantities. For example, riskier lending may go
hand in hand with lower loan volumes which may leave the expected loss volume unchanged. When adding loan
volumes to the VAR we find that the response of volumes is not significantly di↵erent from zero with the mean
showing no clear pattern in either direction, while the other IRFs remain unchanged.
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bonds purchased today is safe and equal to the nominal interest rate Rt. The two funds enable the
representative household to invest into the banking sector and pay an uncertain nominal return
of Rd,t and Re,t. Households maximize their lifetime utility function subject to the per-period
budget constraint in real terms:
maxdt,et,st,ct,Lt E
" 1X
t=0
 t"Bt u (ct, Lt)
#
where u (ct, Lt) =
(ct   ◆ct 1)1  C
1   C exp
✓
'L1+ Lt
 C   1
1 +  L
◆
,
(1)
subject to the per-period budget constraint in real terms:
ct + dt + et + st + Tt = Ltwt + dt 1
Rd,t
⇡t
+ et 1
Re,t
⇡t
+ st 1
Rt 1
⇡t
+⇧t , (2)
where ⇡t is the inflation rate, while Tt and⇧ t = ⇧
cap
t + ⇧
equ
t + ⇧
firm
t are respectively taxes
and profits form firm ownership, expressed in real terms. We assume that in each period a
preference shock "Bt shifts overall utility, and evolves according to a first-order autoregressive
process; furthermore we allow for habits in consumption. From the first-order conditions with
respect to consumption and savings we obtain the two no-arbitrage conditions:
Et

"Bt+1uc(ct+1, Lt+1)
Rd,t+1
⇡t+1
 
= Et

"Bt+1uc(ct+1, Lt+1)
Rt
⇡t+1
 
(3)
Et

"Bt+1uc(ct+1, Lt+1)
Re,t+1
⇡t+1
 
= Et

"Bt+1uc(ct+1, Lt+1)
Rt
⇡t+1
 
(4)
where uc(ct, Lt) is the marginal period utility of consumption. The first-order condition for
consumption yields the usual Euler equation:
uc(ct, Lt) =  Et
⇥
"Bt+1uc(ct+1, Lt+1)Rt
⇤
, (5)
3.2 Labor unions, final and intermediate good producers
The problems faced by final and intermediate good producers, as well as by labor unions, are
standard. We discuss them briefly and refer to Smets and Wouters [2007] for further details.
The corresponding equilibrium conditions are listed in appendix C.
Final good producers assemble di↵erent varieties of intermediate goods through a Kimball
[1995] aggreator with stochastic elasticity of substitution "pt , taking as given both the final good
price and the prices of intermediate goods. Their optimization problem yields demand functions
for each intermediate good variety as a function of its relative price.
A continuum of firms produces di↵erentiated intermediate goods using capitalKt and “packed”
labor ldt as inputs. The production function is Cobb-Douglas and is a↵ected by a total factor
productivity shock At, which is persistent with log-normal innovations. Firms use their monop-
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olistic power to set prices, taking as given their demand schedule. As in Calvo [1983], they can
reset their prices in each period with probability  p, otherwise they index their prices to past
inflation with degree  p and to steady state inflation with degree (1   p).
The labor market resembles the product market: Packed labor is produced by labor packers,
who aggregate di↵erentiated labor services using a Kimball [1995] aggreator with stochastic
elasticity of substitution "wt .
Di↵erentiated labor services are produced by a continuum of unions from the households
labor supply. They use their monopolistic power to set wages. Wages are reset with probability
 w, otherwise they are indexed to past inflation (with degree  w) and steady state inflation.
3.3 Equity and deposit funds
As we explain in detail below, there is a continuum of banks which intermediate the households’
savings using deposits and equity. Each bank is subject to a binary idiosyncratic shock which
makes a bank fail with probability 1   qt 1, in which case equity is wiped out completely and
depositors receive partial compensation from the deposit insurance. The equity (deposit) funds’
function is to diversify away the idiosyncratic bank default risk by buying a perfectly diversified
portfolio of 1 period equity (deposits) of all banks.
The deposit fund works without frictions, that is it represents the depositors’ interests per-
fectly as it invests into bank deposits. The deposit fund raises money from the households and
invests it into dt units of deposits10. Next period the fund receives the nominal deposit rate
rd,t from each bank that does not fail. In the case of failed banks, depositors are partially com-
pensated by deposit insurance. Most deposit insurance schemes around the world, including the
US, guarantee all deposits up to a certain maximum amount per bank account11. We represent
this capped insurance model by assuming that the deposit insurance guarantees deposits up to
a fraction  of total bank liabilities lt, which are the sum of deposits dt and equity et. We
assume that the deposit insurance cap is inflation adjusted, to avoid complicating the monetary
policy trade-o↵ by allowing an interdependence between monetary policy and deposit insurance.
We furthermore assume that the deposit insurance cap is binding in equilibrium12, i.e. that the
bank’s liabilities exceed the cap of the insurance rd,tdt >  (dt + et)⇡t+1. Using the definition
of the equity ratio kt =
et
dt+et
, the deposit fund receives a real return of  /(1   kt) per unit
of deposits from each defaulting bank at t. Per unit of deposits the deposit fund hence pays a
nominal return of:
Rd,t+1 ⌘ qtrd,t + (1  qt)  
1  kt⇡t+1 . (6)
Unlike the deposit fund, which is managed frictionlessly, the equity fund is subject to a
simple agency problem. In particular, we assume that the fund manager faces two options. He
10We use deposits to refer to both units of deposit funds and units of bank deposits since they are equal. We
do the same for equity.
11For a comprehensive documentation see, for instance, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt et al. [2005].
12We will show later that there is no equilibrium where the cap doesn’t bind.
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can behave diligently and use the funds et, raised at t, to invest into et units of bank equity.
A fraction qt of banks will pay back a return of re,t+1 next period while the defaulting banks
pay back nothing. Alternatively the fund manager can abscond with the funds, in which case
he consumes a fraction ⇠ of the funds in the subsequent period and the rest is lost. Since he
is a small member in the big family of the representative household his utility from doing so
is uc(ct+1, Lt+1)⇠et. To prevent the fund manager from absconding funds, the equity providers
promise to pay him a premium pt at time t + 1 conditional on not absconding. The associated
utility for the fund manager is uc(ct+1, Lt+1)pt. The minimum premium to rule out absconding
is just high enough to make him indi↵erent between absconding and investing, i.e. pt = ⇠et.
The profit made by the equity fund manager is then rebated lump sum to the household. Once
absconding is ruled out in equilibrium, the equity fund manager perfectly represents the interests
of the equity providers. The nominal return on the bank equity portfolio is qtre,t+1 per unit of
equity, and the equity investors receive a gross nominal pay-o↵ per unit of equity of:
Re,t+1 ⌘ qtre,t+1   ⇠⇡t+1 . (7)
Note that, since bank equity is the residual income claimant, the return of the equity fund is
a↵ected by all types of aggregate risk that influences the surviving banks’ returns.
The two financial distortions introduced so far have important implications. The agency
problem implies an equity premium, i.e. a premium of the return on equity over the risk-free rate.
Deposit insurance is instead a subsidy on deposits, which further reduces the cost of deposits
relative to equity. As explained below, the di↵erence in the costs of these two funding types
induce a meaningful trade-o↵ between bank equity and bank deposits under limited liability.
3.4 Capital producers
We assume that the capital production process is risky in a way that nests the standard New
Keynesian model. In particular, capital is produced by a continuum of capital producers indexed
by m. At period t they invest it units of final good into a capital project of size omt . This project
is successful with probability qmt , in which case the project yields K
m
t+1 = (!1   !22 qmt )omt units
of capital at t + 1. Else, the project fails and only the liquidation value of ✓omt units of capital
can be recovered (where ✓ ⌧ a   b2qmt ). Each capital producer has access to a continuum of
technologies with di↵erent risk-return characteristics indexed by qm 2 [0, 1]. Given a chosen
technology qmt , the output of producer m evolves as follows:
Kmt+1 =
8<:
 
!1   !22 qmt
 
omt with probablity q
m
t
✓omt else
Implying that the safer the technology (higher qm), the lower is output in case of success.
The bank orders the capital projects and requires the capital producer to use a certain
technology, but this choice cannot be observed by any third party. Since the capital producer is
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a representative firm we can drop the index m. Given the technology choice qt, we can exploit
the law of large numbers to derive the law of motion of capital:
Kt+1 = qt
⇣
!1   !2
2
qt
⌘
ot + (1  qt)st✓t . (8)
Furthermore we assume that capital, which depreciates at rate  , becomes a project (of
undefined qt) at the end of every period. That is, existing capital may be destroyed due to
unsuccessful reuse, and it can be reused under a di↵erent technology than it was originally
produced13.
The total supply of capital projects by the capital producers is the sum of the existing capital
projects ooldt = (1   )Kt, which they purchase from the owners (the banks) at price Qt, and the
newly created projects onewt , which are created by investing it units of the final good. We allow
for investment adjustment costs, i.e. we assume that it units of investment yield 1  S(it/it 1)
units of project, where S = 
⇣
it
it 1   1
⌘2
. Hence ot = onewt + o
old
t and o
new
t =
⇣
1  S
⇣
it
it 1
⌘⌘
it.
Capital producers maximize their expected discounted profits taking as given the price Qt and
the households stochastic discount factor14:
maxit,ooldt E
1X
0
 tuc(ct)"
B
t

Qt
✓
1  S
✓
it
it 1
◆◆
it +Qto
old
t   it  Qtooldt
 
.
While the old capital projects are always reused, the marginal capital project is always a new
one15. Hence, the price of projects Qt is determined by new projects according to the well known
Tobin’s q equation:
Qt

1  S
✓
it
it 1
◆
  S0
✓
it
it 1
◆
it
it 1
 
  1 =   uc(ct+1)"
B
t+1
uc(ct)"Bt
"
Qt+1S
0
✓
it+1
it
◆✓
it+1
it
◆2#
. (9)
Note that our model of risky capital production boils down to the standard riskless setting
of the New Keynesian model if we set qt = 1 and !1   !22 = 1.
3.5 The Bank
The bank is the central agent of our model and is modeled similarly as in Dell’Ariccia et al.
[2014]. Banks raise resources through deposits and equity and invest them into a risky project.
Since depositors cannot observe the banks’ risk choice and banks are protected from the downside
risk of their investment by limited liability, an agency problem arises between them when the
banks choose the risk level. The less equity a bank has, the higher the incentives for risk taking.
13This assumption ensures that we do not have to keep track of the distribution of di↵erent project types.
Think of a project as a machine that delivers capital services and that can be run at di↵erent speeds (levels of
risk). In case it is run at higher speed, the probability of an accident that destroys the machine is higher. After
each period the existing machines are overhauled by the capital producers and at this point the speed setting can
be changed.
14Their out of steady state profits are rebated lump sum to the household.
15We abstract from a non-negativity constraint on new projects.
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Yet, since deposit insurance and the equity premium drive a wedge between the costs of deposits
and equity, the banks’ optimal capital structure comprises both equity and deposits, balancing
the agency problem associated with deposits with the higher costs of equity. We will show that
the equilibrium risk chosen by the banks is excessive, and that the interest rate influences the
degree of its excessiveness.
We assume that there is a continuum of banks who behave competitively and can be rep-
resented by a representative bank (we therefore omit the bank’s index in what follows). The
bank is owned by the equity providers, and hence maximizes the expected discounted value of
profits16 using the household’s stochastic discount factor. Every period the bank first raises
deposits dt and equity et from the respective funds (optimally choosing its liability structure).
Then it invests these resources into ot capital projects, purchased at price Qt. When investing
into capital projects, the bank can choose the risk characteristic qt of the technology that the
capital producer applies. This risk choice is not observable for depositors. Each bank can only
invest into one project and hence faces investment risk17: with probability qt the bank receives
a high pay-o↵ from the capital project; with probability 1   qt the investment fails and yields
only the liquidation value ✓. Assuming a su ciently low value for ✓, a failed project implies
that the bank, which is protected by limited liability, defaults. In case of success the bank can
repay its investors: depositors receive their promised return rd,t and equity providers get the
state contingent return re,t+1. In case of default equity providers get nothing and depositors get
the liquidation value plus the deposit insurance.
It is useful to think of the bank’s problem as a recursive two-stage problem. In the second
stage, the bank chooses the optimal risk level qt given a certain capital structure and a certain
cost of deposits. In the first stage, the bank chooses the optimal capital structure, anticipating
the implied solution for the second stage problem. Note that not only the bank but also the
bank’s financiers anticipate the second-stage risk choice and price deposits and equity accordingly,
which is understood by the bank. Below we derive the solution for this recursive problem.
Before we do so, we need to establish the bank’s objective function. Per euro of funds raised
(through deposits and equity) in period t the bank gets 1/Pt units of consumption good, where
Pt is the current price level. These 1/Pt units of consumption goods are invested into a capital
project of value (1/Pt)/Qt and type qt, which are bought from the capital producer at price Qt.
If the project is successful it turns into (!1   !22 qt)/(QtPt) capital goods. In the next period
t + 1, the bank rents the capital to the firm, who pays the real rental rate rk,t+1 per unit of
capital Kt+1. Furthermore the bank receives the depreciated capital, which becomes a capital
16Profits in excess of the opportunity costs of equity.
17The assumption that the bank can only invest into one project and can not diversify the project risk might
sound stark. Yet three clarifications are in place: First, our setup is isomorphic to a model where the bank invests
into an optimally diversified portfolio of investments but is too small to perfectly diversify its portfolio. The
binary payo↵ is then to be interpreted as the portfolio’s expected payo↵ conditional on default resp. repayment.
Second, if the bank was able to perfectly diversify risk, then limited liability would become meaningless and we
would have a model without financial frictions. Third, we don’t allow the bank to buy the safe asset. Yet this
assumption is innocuous: since the banks demand a higher return on investment than the households due to the
equity premium, banks wouldn’t purchase the safe asset even if they could.
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project again, with real value of (1   )Qt+1 per unit of capital Kt+1. The bank’s total nominal
income, per euro raised, conditional on success is therefore:
(!1   !2
2
qt)
rk,t+1 + (1   )Qt+1
Qt
Pt+1
Pt
At the same time, the bank has to pay the per-unit funding costs rd,t and re,t+1. Using the
equity ratio kt, the per-unit total nominal payment to be made in t + 1 in case of success is
re,t+1kt + rd,t (1  kt).
The bank maximizes the expected discounted value of this excess profit, using the stochastic
discount factor of the equity holders, that is the household. Given the success probability of qt
and the fact that the equity providers receive nothing in case of default, the bank’s objective
function is:
maxqt,kt  E

uc (ct+1, Lt+1) "Bt+1
⇡t+1
qt
✓⇣
!1   !2
2
qt
⌘ rk,t+1 + (1   )Qt+1
Qt
⇡t+1   rd,t(1  kt)  re,t+1kt
◆ 
(10)
Note that we did not multiply the per-unit profits by the quantity of investment. In doing so
we anticipate the equilibrium condition that the bank, whose objective function is linear in the
quantity of investment, needs to be indi↵erent about the quantity of investment. The quantity
will be pinned down together with the return on capital by the bank’s balance sheet equation
et + dt = Qtot, the market clearing and zero profit conditions.
The bank’s problem can be solved analytically, yet the expressions get fairly complex. There-
fore we derive the solution of the banks problem for the case that  = ✓ = 0, that is without
deposit insurance and with a liquidation value of 0. This simplifies the expressions but the intu-
ition remains the same. Allowing  and ✓ to be nonzero on the other hand is necessary to bring
the model closer to the data.
To make notation more tractable we rewrite the bank’s objective function (10) in real variables
expressed in marginal utility units18:
!1qtr˜l,t   !2
2
q2t r˜l,t   qtr˜d,t(1  kt)  qtr˜e,tkt , (11)
For later use we rewrite the household’s no-arbitrage conditions (3) and (4) combined with the
definition of the funds’ returns (6) and (7) as r˜d,t =
R˜t
qt
and r˜e,t =
R˜t+⇠˜t
qt
. Let us now solve the
bank’s problem recursively.
18That is we use the following definitions: r˜l,t = E
h
uc (ct+1, Lt+1) "Bt+1
⇣
rk,t+1+(1  )Qt+1
Qt
⌘i
, r˜d,t =
E
h
uc (ct+1, Lt+1) "Bt+1
rd,t
⇡t+1
i
, r˜e,t = E
h
uc (ct+1, Lt+1) "Bt+1
re,t+1
⇡t+1
i
, R˜t = E
h
uc (ct+1, Lt+1) "Bt+1
Rt
⇡t+1
i
, ⇠˜t =
E
⇥
uc(ct+1, Lt+1)"Bt+1⇠
⇤
.
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3.5.1 Second-stage problem:
At the second stage, the bank has already raised et + dt funds and now needs to choose the risk
characteristic of her investment qt, such that equity holders’ utility is maximized. As already
mentioned, we assume that the bank cannot write contracts conditional on qt with the depositors
at stage one, since qt is not observable to them. Therefore at the second stage the bank takes the
deposit rate as given. Furthermore, since the capital structure is already determined, maximizing
the excess profit coincides with maximizing the profit of equity holders. The bank’s objective
function is therefore:
max
qt
!1qtr˜l,t   !2
2
q2t r˜l,t   qtr˜d,t(1  kt) . (12)
Solving problem (12) with respect to qt yields the following first-order condition19:
qt =
!1r˜l,t   r˜d,t (1  kt)
w2r˜l,t
. (13)
3.5.2 First-stage problem:
At the point of writing the deposit contract in stage one, depositors anticipate the bank’s choices
in stage two and therefore the depositors’ no arbitrage condition r˜d,t =
R˜t
qt
must hold in equilib-
rium20. Using this equation together with the previous first-oder condition (13) we can derive
the optimal qt as a function of kt and r˜l,t:
qˆt ⌘ qt(kt) = 1
2!2r˜l,t
✓
!1r˜l,t +
q
(!1r˜l,t)
2   4!2r˜l,tR˜t(1  kt)
◆
. (14)
We can now solve the first-stage problem of the banker. The bank chooses the capital structure
kt to maximize her excess profits, anticipating the qt(kt) that will be chosen at the second stage:
max
kt
qˆt!1r˜l,t   !2
2
r˜l,tqˆ
2
t   qtr˜d,t(1  kt)  qtr˜e,tkt , (15)
subject to the no-arbitrage condition for depositors (r˜d,t =
R˜t
qt
) and for equity providers (r˜e,t =
R˜t+⇠˜t
qt
). Plugging these in and deriving, we obtain the first-order condition for kt:
!1r˜l,t
@qˆt
@kt
  ⇠˜t   !2
2
r˜l,t
@qˆ2t
@kt
= 0 . (16)
19We focus on interior solutions and choose the larger of the two roots, which is the closest to the optimum, as
we will see below.
20Note that the agency problem arises from the fact that the bank does not consider this as a constraint of its
maximization problem.
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which (assuming an interior solution) can be solved for kt as:
kˆt ⌘ kt (r˜l,t) = 1  ⇠˜t(R˜t + ⇠˜t)(!1r˜l,t)
2
!2R˜tr˜l,t
⇣
R˜t + 2⇠˜t
2
⌘ . (17)
3.5.3 Closing the bank model: the zero-profit condition
Since there is a continuum of identical banks, each bank behaves competitively and takes the
return on investment r˜l,t as given. Prefect competition and free entry imply that banks will
enter until there are no expected excess profits to be made. In the presence of uncertainty of the
future it is natural to focus on the case that banks make no excess profit under any future state
of the world:⇣
!1   !2
2
qt 1
⌘✓rk,t + (1   )Qt
Qt 1
◆
  rd,t 1
⇡t
(1  kˆt 1)  re,t
⇡t
kˆt 1 = 0 . (18)
Using the equity and deposit supply schedules and taking expectation over this equation we get:
qˆt!1r˜l,t   !2
2
r˜l,tqˆ
2
t   qtr˜d,t(1  kˆt)  kˆt⇠˜t   ktR˜t . (19)
Combining (19) with the optimality conditions (14) and (17), we can derive analytical expres-
sions for the equity ratio kt, riskiness choice qt (the last term in each row is the approximation
under certainty equivalence):
kt =
R˜t
R˜t + 2⇠˜t
t R
r
t
Rrt + 2⇠
(20)
qt =
!1(⇠˜t + R˜t)
!2(2⇠˜t + R˜t)
t !1(⇠ +R
r
t )
!2(2⇠ +Rrt )
(21)
Note that, as the real risk-free rate Rrt =
Rt
E[⇡t+1]
decreases, the riskiness of the bank (1  qt)
increases21, while the equity ratio kt falls as banks substitute equity with deposits.
How can this e↵ect be explained? On one hand, a lower risk-free rate decreases the rate of
return on capital projects, reducing the benefits of safer investments, conditional on repayment.
This induces the bank to adopt a riskier investment technology. On the other hand, the lower
risk-free rate reduces the cost of funding, leaving more resources available to the bank’s owners
in case of repayment: this force contrasts the first one, making safer investments more attractive.
There is a third force: a lower risk-free interest rate means that the equity premium becomes
relatively more important. As a result the bank shifts from equity to deposits, internalizing less
the consequences of the risk decision and choosing a higher level of risk. The first and third
e↵ects dominate, and overall a decline in the real interest rate induces banks to choose more risk.
21At least up to a first order approximation, when the uc (ct+1, Lt+1) terms contained in the tilde variables
cancel out.
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Since in a monetary model the real interest rate is a function of the nominal interest rate, which
is the standard monetary policy tool, this mechanism provides an explanation for the risk-taking
channel, documented in the empirical works discussed in section 2.
3.5.4 Excessive vs. frictionless risk taking
Limited liability and the impossibility of the banker to commit to a certain risk choice in stage
2 generate the agency problem of the bank, which leads to a suboptimal equilibrium. The
importance of this friction can be assessed by comparing the solution of the bank model with
incomplete contracts and limited liability to the solution of the model without any frictions. The
frictionless risk choice can be derived under any of the following alternative scenarios: Either
both equity premium and deposit insurance are zero (which eliminates the cost disadvantage
of equity and leads to 100% equity finance), or contracts are complete and deposit insurance is
zero (which eliminates the agency problem and leads to 100% deposit finance), or liability is not
limited (as before), or household invests directly into a diversified portfolio of capital projects
(which eliminates the financial sector all together). Since in a frictionless model qt is chosen to
maximize the consumption value of the expected return:
maxqt r˜l,t(!1  
!2
2
qt)qt ,
the optimal level of qt trivially is qot =
!1
!2
. Comparing the frictionless risk choice qot and the
choice given the friction qft
qft = q
o
t
⇠˜t + R˜t
2⇠˜t + R˜t
⇡ ⇠ +R
r
t
2⇠ +Rrt
,
we observe that the agency friction drives a wedge between the frictionless and the actually chosen
risk level. This wedge has two important features. Firstly, it is smaller than one22, implying
that under the agency problem the probability of repayment is too low, and hence banks choose
excessive risk. Secondly, note that the wedge depends on Rrt and that the derivative of the first
order approximation of the wedge w.r.t. Rrt is positive. is positive. This implies that the wedge
increases, i.e. risk taking gets more excessive, as the real interest rate falls. Note that this feature
of the model is consistent with the empirical finding of Ioannidou et al. [2014] that additional
risk taking is ine cient.
But not only the bank risk choice is suboptimal. Also the capital structure is chosen sub-
optimally. If banks could commit to choose the optimal level of risk, they would not need any
skin in the game. Hence they would avoid costly equity and would finance themselves fully by
deposits: kot = 0. Instead they choose k
f
t =
R˜t
R˜t+2⇠˜t
. The wedge between the frictionless and the
actual equity ratio resembles the two features of the risk wedge. First, it is bigger than one, so
there is excessive use of equity funding. Second, up to a first order approximation, the equity
22This is true under certainty equivalence, i.e. up to first order approximation.
15
wedge is increasing in Rrt .
Both the risk and the capital structure choice have welfare implications. A marginal increase
in qt means a more e cient risk choice and should hence - ceteris paribus - be welfare improving.
At the same time a marginal increase in kt implies, due to the equity premium, a higher markup
in the intermediation process and hence - ceteris paribus - lower welfare. Since both qt and kt
are increasing functions of the real interest rate, this begs the question of whether an increase
in the real rate alleviates or intensifies the misallocation due to the banking friction23. The
answer to this question depends on the full set of general equilibrium conditions. Given the
estimated model, we will later numerically verify that the positive first e↵ect dominates, i.e. an
increase in Rrt has welfare improving consequences on the banking market
24. The existence of
these opposing welfare e↵ects further motivates our optimal policy discussion in the last section.
3.5.5 Full model with deposit insurance and liquidation value
The simplified version of the bank’s problem presented so far is useful to explain the basic
mechanism. Yet deposit insurance and a non zero liquidation value are important to improve
the quantitative fit of our model to the data.
The assumptions made about deposit insurance and the liquidation value imply that deposi-
tors get the maximum of the amount covered by deposit insurance and the value of the capital
that remains from the failed project. That means that their return in case of default is:
min
✓
rd,t
⇡t+1
,max
✓
rk,t+1 + (1   )Qt+1
Qt(1  kt) s,
 
1  kt
◆◆
.
To make deposit insurance meaningful we assume that the scap value ✓ is small enough such
that rk,t+1+(1  )Qt+1Qt(1 kt) ✓ <
 
1 kt . Furthermore there can be no equilibrium such that the cap is not
binding, as proven in appendix D. Deposits therefore pay  1 kt in case of default. Combining
the nominal return on the the deposit funds (6) with the households no-arbitrage condition, and
defining  ˜t = E
⇥
uc(ct+1, Lt+1)"Bt+1
⇤
 , we can write the deposit supply schedule as:
qtr˜d,t + (1  qt)  ˜t
1  kt = R˜t . (22)
We assume that the deposit insurance scheme, which covers the gap between the insurance
cap and the liquidation value for the depositors of failing banks, is financed through a variable
tax on capital. The return on loans r˜l,t can then be rewritten as:
23These two opposing forces are well known from the literature on bank capital regulation, where a raise in the
capital requirements hampers e cient intermediation but leads to a more stable banks.
24The dominance of the risk-taking e↵ect is intuitive for two reasons: First, while risk taking entails a real cost,
the equity premium just entails a wedge but no direct real costs. Second, as the real interest rate moves up the
equity premium becomes less important, so a more e cient allocation is intuitive.
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r˜l,t ⌘ rk,t+1 + (1   )Qt+1   ⌧t
Qt
where ⌧t ⌘
Qt
1 qt
qt
⇣
   ✓ rk,t+1+(1  )Qt+1Qt
⌘
!1   !22 qt
We choose this tax to perfectly o↵set the distortion on the quantity of investment caused by the
deposit insurance. In this way, deposit insurance influences only the funding decision of the bank
and, through that, the risk choice. Hence, if qt was chosen optimally (or was simply a parameter)
the deposit insurance would not have any e↵ect.
The same procedure as outlined above can be applied to obtain closed-form solutions25 for
the risk choice and the equity ratio. The solutions can be found in appendix C. Note that the
observations in subsection 3.5.4 remain valid. The deviation of the chosen risk (equity ratio)
from the optimal level decreases (increases) in the real interest rate. Given our estimation, the
risk e↵ect dominates in terms of welfare implications. The intuition is similar as before. Deposit
insurance makes deposits cheaper relative to equity: as a result, the bank will demand more
deposits and choose a riskier investment portfolio. Deposit insurance furthermore strengthens
the risk-taking channel, which is now a↵ected not only by the importance of the equity premium
relative to the real interest rate, but also by the importance the the deposit insurance cap relative
to the real interest rate. On the other hand, the e cient risk level is not a↵ected by the deposit
insurance.
The liquidation value is irrelevant for the banks’ and investors’ choice since it is assumed to
be smaller than deposit insurance. Yet it eases the excessiveness of risk taking since it increases
the optimal level of risk: qot =
!1 ✓
!2
.
3.6 Monetary and fiscal policy
The central bank follows a nominal interest rate rule, targeting inflation and output deviations
from the steady state:
Rt   R¯ = (1  ⇢) ( ⇡⇡ˆt +  y yˆt) + ⇢
 
Rt 1   R¯
 
+ "Rt , (23)
where ⇢ is a smoothing parameter, the hat symbol denotes percentage deviations from the steady
state values, R¯ = ⇡ss  is the steady state nominal interest rate, and "
R
t is a monetary policy shock.
In addition, the fiscal authority finances a stochastic expenditure stream gyY¯ "Gt :
ln
 
"Gt
 
= ⇢gln
 
"Gt 1
 
+ uGt + ⇢GAu
A
t ,
where we are allowing for a correlation between exogenous spending and innovations to total
factor productivity26. For simplicity we rule out government debt (st = 0), implying that all
25In this case, one needs to apply the adjusted deposit supply schedule (22) and to make sensible assumptions
about the relative size of parameters and about the root when solving the zero-profit equation.
26This is a shortcut to take exports into account. Productivity innovations might rise exports in the data, and
a way to capture it in a closed-economy model such as ours is to allow for ⇢GA 6= 0 as in Smets and Wouters
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expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes; i.e. gyY¯ "Gt = Tt .
4 Steady-state and dynamic implications of excessive risk
taking in the estimated model
In this section we examine the steady-state and dynamic macroeconomic implications of the
risk-taking channel, before we turn to discussing optimal monetary policy in section 5. Since we
are interested in performing a quantitative evaluation of the risk-taking channel, the quantitative
discussion is based on an estimated version of the model.
4.1 Model estimation
We have embedded our risk-taking channel in a medium-scale model which closely resembles27
the non-linear version of Smets and Wouters [2007]. This serves two purpouses. First, in order to
perform a sound monetary policy evaluation we need a quantitative model that is able to replicate
key empirical moments of the data. Second, it helps to understand whether our channel is
quantitatively important compared to other monetary and real frictions that a↵ect the monetary
policy trade-o↵.
A linearised28 version of the model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using 7 US macroe-
conomic time series from 1983q1 to 2007q3. These are the federal funds rate, the log of hours
worked, inflation and the growth rates in the real hourly wage and in per-capita real GDP, real
consumption, and real investment. For a full description of the data we refer to appendix A and
to the supplementary material of Smets and Wouters [2007]. The observation equations, linking
the observed time series to the variables in the model, as well as the prior specifications can be
found in appendix C.
Table 2 summarizes the parameter values, which are broadly in line with existing empirical
estimates for the US. The steady state inflation rate is estimated to be about 2.5% on an annual
basis. The discount factor is estimated to be 0.996 implying an annual steady-state real interest
rate of around 1.5%. Wages appear to be slower moving than prices: wages are reoptimized every
year and a half, while prices are reoptimized approximately every six months. The coe cient of
relative risk aversion  c is estimated to be 1.90, well above its prior mean. The posterior estimates
of the Taylor rule parameters show a strong response to inflation and output (respectively 1.83
and 0.05), and a high degree of interest rate smoothing (0.85). The data are very informative
on the parametes a↵ecting the shock distribution, and no shock plays a predominant role in
explaning output fluctuations, though the monetary policy shock and the two markup shocks
[2007].
27Of all nominal and real frictions considered in Smets and Wouters [2007], we are missing the one concerning
capital utilization, which is shown to be of secondary importance once wage stickiness is taken into account.
28In the future we plan to estimate the model non-linearly, in order to verify whether the non linear relationship
between the real interest rate and risk-taking is quantitatively important. We further plan to use banking-sector
variables in oder to refine the estimation of the banking sector parameters.
18
are found to be relatively less important. Finally, the estimated banking sector parameters are
in favour of the risk-taking channel hypothesis: the posterior mean of the equity premium is
around an annualised value of 6.6%, in line with the empirical estimates of Mehra and Prescott
[1985], deposit insurance covers up to 79% of total bank liabilities and the recovery rate is about
50%.
4.2 Steady-state and dynamic implication of excessive risk taking
In Table 3 we compare the non-stochastic steady state of the model with banking frictions
(henceforth bank model) with that of the model without banking frictions. In the latter model
the capital structure is undetermined and risk is equal to the socially optimal level. For the
given set of estimated values, the optimum is a corner solution: qo = 1. In the bank model, the
capital ratio is below one, implying that banks do not fully internalize the implications of their
risk choice, and choose a level of risk that is not optimal from a social perspective. In the steady
state of the bank model there is therefore excess risk taking (q¯f < q¯o). This implies that the
capital production technology is ine cient. Consequently, the bank economy is under-capitalized
in the steady state, and output, consumption and welfare are ine ciently low.
To understand the dynamic e↵ects of the risk taking channel, we now assess how the propaga-
tion mechanism of the model di↵ers if a risk-taking channel is present. For illustration, we discuss
an expansionary monetary policy shock. As we have just seen, the economy without financial
frictions and the bank economy have di↵erent steady states. This makes dynamic comparisons of
the two models di cult, since both the di↵erent behaviors of qt and kt and the di↵erent steady
states imply di↵erent dynamics. In order not to mix the two e↵ects, we focus on comparing mod-
els with the same steady state. For this purpose we alter the model without financial frictions
by treating the risk choice qt and the equity ratio kt as parameters, which we set to the steady
state values of the bank model. This model, henceforth benchmark model, has not only the same
steady state as the bank model but also corresponds to a standard New Keynesian model with
a small markup in capital markets.
In figure 3 we compare the dynamic responses in the bank model (solid red lines) and in
benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to an expansionary monetary policy shock, based on the
posterior means reported in Table 2. A monetary policy expansion triggers a set of standard
reactions, which are evident in the benchmark model. An unexpected fall in the nominal risk-free
rate causes a drop in the real interest rate, since prices are sticky. Consequently, consumption
is shifted forward, firms that can adjust the price do so causing an increase in inflation, while
the remaining firms increase production. The risk-taking channel adds two futher elements as
both the risk level and the capital structure chosen by the bank respond to the real interest
rate movement. On impact, the drop in the real interest rate cause banks to substitute equity
for deposits, and to choose a higher risk taking (lower loan safety). The risk choice therefore
moves further away from the optimal level and the expected return on aggregate investment
drops. This implies that households would have to invest more to maintain the same path of
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Table 2: Model estimation: prior and posterior values
parameter prior shape prior mean prior std post. mean 90% HPD interval
model parameters
µy trend growth normal 0.4 0.1 0.4348 0.4012 0.4649
µl labor normalization normal 0 2 0.3821 -0.9944 1.7173
↵ output share normal 0.3 0.05 0.2029 0.1682 0.2423
100 1    real rate in % normal 0.25 0.1 0.4063 0.297 0.5297
"¯P price markup normal 1.25 0.12 1.4907 1.3436 1.6451
⇡¯ inflation in % gamma 0.62 0.1 0.6352 0.5098 0.7865
 ⇡ TR weight on
inflation
normal 1.5 0.25 1.825 1.4869 2.1242
 y TR weight on output normal 0.12 0.05 0.0508 -0.0258 0.1231
⇢ TR persistence beta 0.75 0.1 0.8493 0.8074 0.8912
 investment adj. costs normal 4 1.5 6.6501 4.7567 8.654
◆ habits normal 0.7 0.1 0.7277 0.6152 0.8462
 c risk aversion gamma 1.5 0.375 1.9071 1.4588 2.3804
 l disutility from labor gamma 2 0.75 2.2369 1.2607 3.3389
✓ liquidation value normal 0.5 0.05 0.5021 0.4295 0.5717
 deposit insurance normal 0.8 0.05 0.7881 0.7328 0.8489
!2 risk return trade-o↵ normal 0.41 0.05 0.4122 0.3335 0.4984
⇠ equity premium normal 0.015 0.01 0.0166 0.0017 0.0307
 p price calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.5767 0.4967 0.6642
 w wage calvo parameter beta 0.5 0.1 0.8201 0.7807 0.864
 p price indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.2912 0.1187 0.452
 w wage indexation beta 0.5 0.15 0.4881 0.2401 0.7229
shocks
 A stdev TFP uniform 0.5 0.2 0.9167 0.8572 0.9684
 B stdev preference uniform 0.5 0.2 0.2491 0.0647 0.4253
 G stdev govt. spending uniform 0.5 0.2 0.981 0.9688 0.9938
 I stdev investment uniform 0.5 0.2 0.689 0.5639 0.8077
 P stdev price markup uniform 0.5 0.2 0.9362 0.883 0.9905
 R stdev monetary uniform 0.5 0.2 0.5933 0.4898 0.7103
 W stdev wage markup uniform 0.5 0.2 0.8823 0.833 0.9406
⇢A persistence TFP beta 0 1 0.3788 0.3266 0.4268
⇢B persistence preference beta 0 10 3.1301 1.7896 4.3806
⇢G persistence gov.
spending
beta 0 10 2.2331 1.9541 2.5321
⇢I persistence
investment shock
beta 0 10 4.9205 2.9521 6.633
⇢P persistence price
markup
beta 0 1 0.098 0.0747 0.1228
⇢R persistence monetary beta 0 1 0.0977 0.0837 0.1144
⇢W persistence wage
markup
beta 0 1 0.4952 0.4322 0.5692
⇢G,A correlation gov.
spending & TFP
uniform 5 2.8868 2.3345 1.2085 3.4284
mp MA component of
price markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.5861 0.4103 0.7905
mw MA component of
wage markup
beta 0.5 0.2 0.9707 0.946 0.9948
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Table 3: Steady state comparison: The model without banking sector frictions features an undetermined
equity ratio (fixed at 0) and risk equal to the socially optimal level; i.e. qo = 1. Parameters are fixed to the
posterior mean estimates of the bank model reported in table 2.
variable model with banking frictions model without banking frictions
q 0.954 1.000
k 0.181 0.000
C 0.632 0.770
K 5.690 15.364
I 0.142 0.157
L 1.000 0.987
Y 0.944 1.130
⇡ 1.006 1.006
R 1.010 1.010
Welfare -1947.876 -1626.163
capital as in the benchmark case, entailing a lower consumption path. Yet this would not be
optimal because of consumption smoothing and because the expected return on investment is
lower. Therefore investment rises less then in the benchmark model, which makes the capital
stock decline considerably. Overall, agents are worse o↵ (in terms of welfare) in the bank model
than in the benchmark economy.
Lastly, note that the responses shown in figurs 3 are in accordance with the stylized facts
established in section 2, in particular with the empirical finding that the response of risk is
proportional to that of the interest rate.
5 Monetary policy with a risk-taking channel
In this section, we explore the implications of the risk-taking channel for optimal monetary policy.
We have seen that the risk-taking channel has both static and dynamic e↵ects. First, unless
corrected for by macroprudential policy, it leads to a distorted steady state with ine ciently
high levels of risk and low levels of capital and consumption. Second, variations in the real
interest rate lead to variations in the risk level and in the equity ratio chosen by the bank. As
the real interest rate decreases, (excessive) risk increases and the equity ratio decreases. While
movements in risk and in the equity ratio have opposing impacts on the e ciency of the economy,
the impulse responses have shown that the risk e↵ect dominates.
But are these additional mechanisms implied by the risk-taking channel actually quantita-
tively significant for monetary policy? To answer this question we determine the optimal simple
implementable monetary policy rule in the risk-taking channel model. We then compare this
policy to the optimal policy in a benchmark economy without the risk-taking channel.
Our comparison of optimal policy in the benchmark and in the bank model has an interesting
interpretation. Suppose that the actual economy features the risk-taking channel (the bank
21
Figure 3: Monetary policy shock in the bank and benchmark models: dynamic responses in the bank
model (solid red lines) and in the benchmark model (dashed blue lines) to an expansionary monetary policy shock,
based on the estimated parameter values in Table 2.
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model), but that the central bank believes that risk is an irrelevant constant from her point
of view. The central bank would then implement optimal policy based on a wrong model (the
benchmark model). Our comparison then answers the question of how important understanding
the risk-taking channel is, in terms of optimal policy and welfare.
Notice that in this paper we consider a central bank that has no policy tools besides the
interest rate. With a second instrument, such as capital regulation, the central bank could do
better or even eliminate the friction. Exploring optimal macroprudential regulation is however
beyond the scope of the present paper, and is left to future research29.
In what follows, we discuss the derivation of the optimal simple implementable monetary
policy rule, and then present our results.
5.1 The central bank problem
We follow Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2007] and characterize optimal monetary policy as the policy
rule that maximizes welfare among the class of simple, implementable interest-rate feedback
rules30 given by:
Rt   R¯ =  ⇡⇡ˆt+s +  y yˆt+s +  kkˆt+s + ⇢
 
Rt 1   R¯
 
. (24)
29For a thorough analysis of the optimal interaction between monetary and macroprudential policy in an
economy with bank risk-taking see Collard et al. [2012].
30The implementability criterion requires uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium, while simplicity
requires the interest rate to be a function of readily observable variables. For a complete discussion, see Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe [2007]. Notice that we drop their second requirement for implementability which is that an
implementable rule must avoid regular zero lower bound violations.
22
where the hat symbol denotes percentage deviations from the steady state, and the index s
allows for forward- or contemporaneous-looking rules (respectively by setting s = 1 or s = 0).
The policy rule specification (24) is chosen for its generality, as it encompasses both standard
Taylor-type rules (setting  k = 0), and the possibility that the central bank reacts to banking
sector leverage ( k 6= 0). Recall that the variable k denotes the ratio of equity to total bank
funding. A fall in the equity ratio implies that banks increase their relative debt financing, i.e.
they increase leverage. When a greater fraction of assets is financed by debt, banks internalize
less the consequences of their investments, and choose loans with a higher default probability.
Hence, a fall in the equity ratio signals an increase in risk taking, to which the central bank may
decide to respond by increasing the interest rate. We choose not to let the interest rate depend
on risk taking directly, because the latter is not a readily observable variable. We furthermore
impose that the parameters on output and inflation have to be non-negative and that the inertia
parameter ⇢ has to be between 0 and 1.
The welfare criterion, that defines the optimal parameter combination for rule (24), is the
household’s conditional lifetime utility:
V ⌘ E0
1X
t=0
 t"Bt u(ct, Lt) . (25)
This measure is commonly used in the literature and yields the expected lifetime utility of the
representative household, conditional on the economy being at the deterministic steady state.
While this measure alone allows us to compute the optimal policy, it is hard to interpret the
welfare di↵erences associated with two di↵erent rules g and b, where g is the rule that provides
a higher welfare. Following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2007], we define our measure for welfare
comparison to be the fraction of the consumption stream that a household would need to receive
as a transfer under rule b to be equally well of as under rule g. Formally, this fraction ⌦ is
implicitly defined by the equation:
V g = E0
1X
t=0
 t"Bt u((1 + ⌦)c
b
t , L
b
t) .
5.2 Findings
Using the welfare criterion just described we numerically determine the coe cients of the op-
timal simple implementable rules in the benchmark and in the bank model using second order
approximations around the non-stochastic steady state. Table 4 reports the optimal coe cients
for 5 di↵erent specifications of the monetary policy rule: contemporaneous and forward-looking,
without inertia and with optimal inertia, without and with reaction to current leverage31. The
coe cients of the optimal rules generally vary greatly between the two models. A set of results,
31Note that reacting to leverage is impossible in the benchmark model where risk and leverage are constant.
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Table 4: Optimal simple rules: optimal parameters for policy rules of the class Rt  R¯ =  ⇡⇡ˆt+s+ y yˆt+s+
 y kˆt+s+⇢
 
Rt 1   R¯
 
. The hat symbol denotes percentage deviations from the steady state. Current- (forward)-
looking rules let the interest rate react to current (future) deviations of variables from their steady state values.
W denotes the welfare level associated with the optimal rule, while ⌦ is the welfare cost (in % of the consumption
stream) associated to implementing in the bank model the optimal policy rule of the benchmark model. For the
benchmark model the restriction  k = 0 is irrelevant, since the equity ratio is a constant in the benchmark model.
Entries without digits indicate restricted parameters.
benchmark model bank model
s rule ⇢  ⇡t+s  yt+s W ⇢  ⇡t+s  yt+s  kt W ⌦
0  k, ⇢ = 0 0 5.909 0.132 -210.723 0 2.622 0.092 0 -211.349 0.234
0  k = 0 0.000 5.909 0.132 -210.723 1.000 0.110 0.009 0 -211.006 0.407
0 ⇢ = 0 0 5.909 0.132 -210.723 0 100.000 5.390 -12.505 -211.337 0.240
1  k, ⇢ = 0 0 21.182 0.341 -210.703 0 3.213 0.118 0 -211.322 0.923
1  k = 0 0.000 21.182 0.341 -210.703 1.000 0.175 0.014 0 -210.954 1.108
which are robust across policy rule and estimation32 specifications, are worth noticing.
First, the optimal coe cients on inflation and output deviations are smaller in the bank model
compared to the benchmark model. For any given change in inflation and output, the nominal
interest rate should move less if a risk-taking channel is present. Furthermore, if the central
bank can optimize over its smoothing parameter, then full interest rate smoothing is optimal
in the bank model. Given that the optimal output coe cient is close to zero, the optimal rule
is close to a stable real interest rate rule. In doing so, the central bank limits fluctuations in
the real interest rate and hence in risk taking and slightly raises the average level of q towards
the e cient value, as it can be seen in table 5. At the same time inflation is significantly more
volatile under the optimal rule. If a risk-taking channel is present, the central bank should accept
higher inflation fluctuations in order to reduce the distortion stemming from risk taking.
What is the intuition behind this result? Monetary policy cannot a↵ect the deterministic
steady state, but it can control the real interest rate and therefore the fluctuations in excessive
risk. Upward movements of the real interest rate are welfare enhancing since they lower the
level of risk taking towards the e cient level, whereas downward changes of the real interest
rate lead to even more excessive risk taking. But this does not mean that movements in the
interest rate are irrelevant. Since the expected return on investments qt(!1   !22 qt) is convex in
the real interest rate, negative deviations of the real rate have a negative e↵ect on the e ciency
of the intermediation process, that is stronger than the positive e↵ect of positive deviations of
the real rate. Therefore the risk-taking channel provides a motive for keeping the real interest
rate constant. This tilts the balance in the trade-o↵ between inflation and output stabilization
in the benchmark model towards less inflation stabilization.
Second, it is optimal for the central bank to respond to leverage. The reason is, that leverage
32We have experimented with di↵erent estimation samples and di↵erent fixed parameters: while the optimized
parameters and transfers slightly change, the qualitative results discussed in the text are very robust. Results are
available upon request.
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Table 5: Di↵erences in moments associated to the optimal simple rules in the benchmark and in
the bank model: main entries are the % di↵erences in the mean and standard deviation associated to applying
the di↵erent optimal rules in the bank model. The first entry, for example, indicates that under the optimal
bank policy rule average risk would be 0.042% lower than if the rule, optimal for the benchmark model, had been
applied.
mean standard deviation
s rule q R ⇡ y c q R ⇡ y c
0  k, ⇢ = 0 0.042 -0.001 -0.033 0.149 0.233 -47.618 -47.618 55.000 1.124 -2.112
0  k = 0 0.060 0.002 -0.063 0.209 0.319 -69.242 -69.242 89.646 0.474 -0.449
0 ⇢ = 0 0.043 -0.001 -0.039 0.156 0.243 -48.935 -48.935 55.415 1.101 -1.916
1  k, ⇢ = 0 0.124 -0.006 -0.046 0.551 0.859 -68.276 -68.276 100.578 1.106 -7.116
1  k = 0 0.142 -0.004 -0.075 0.617 0.953 -82.417 -82.417 134.242 0.896 -6.800
signals risk taking (there is a one to one mapping from leverage to risk). Since leverage and risk
taking do not only depend on the nominal interest rate (the instrument), but also on expected
inflation, this allows the central bank to steer risk taking more precisely. Once risk taking is
taken care of the monetary authority can again respond aggresively to inflation deviations from
the steady state. Yet the additional welfare gains of augmenting the policy rule with a response
to leverage are quantitatively small.
To understand how di↵erent the equilibria associated to the two optimal rules are, and
therefore how important it is for the central bank to take the risk-taking channel into account,
we compute the cost ⌦ of applying in the bank model the rule that is optimal for the benchmark
model. These costs, expressed in % of the lifetime consumption stream, are reported in the
last column of table 4. Though the costs vary a lot across policy specifications, they are always
non negligible. For the best performing policy (last row of table 4), the costs of applying the
benchmark policy in the bank model is around 1.11% of the lifetime consumption stream in every
quarter. Hence, internalising the feedback e↵ect that the nominal interest rate has on bank risk
taking pays o↵ in terms of welfare.
6 Conclusions
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the importance of monitoring the level of risk to which
the financial sector is exposed. In this paper we focus on one aspect of financial sector risk,
ex-ante bank asset risk, and on how the latter can be influenced by monetary policy.
First, we provide new empirical evidence of the impact of monetary policy on bank risk taking.
We document that unexpected monetary policy shocks, identified through sign restrictions in
a classical VAR framework, increase a measure for ex-ante bank risk taking in the US. This
conclusion, robust to using a recursive identification scheme, is compatible with the monetary
policy transmission mechanism in the theoretical model that we build to explain the e↵ects of
monetary policy on risk taking.
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For this purpose, we extend the work of Dell’Ariccia et al. [2014] and build a general-
equilibrium model where low levels of the risk-free interest rate induce banks to extend credit
to riskier borrowers. At the core of this mechanism is an agency problem between depositors
and equity providers: the latter choose the level of risk but are protected by limited liability.
This friction leads to a steady state with excessive risk taking, and ine ciently low levels of
capital, output and consumption. Furthermore, risk taking alters the dynamic response of the
economy to shocks. In particular, an expansionary monetary policy shock has unintended conse-
quences: because banks choose a riskier investment strategy, the growth of capital, output and
consumption will be lower than in the model without the risk-taking channel.
In order to assess the importance of the risk-taking channel and to study optimal monetary
policy, we estimate the model on US data. We study optimal monetary policy in this environment,
using optimal simple rules. Our results suggest that, if a risk-taking channel is present and the
interest rate is the only instrument available to the monetary authority, the optimal rule should
stabilize the path of the real interest rate more than without the risk-taking channel. This
implies that the central bank should tolerate higher inflation volatility in order to reduce welfare
detrimental fluctuations in risk taking. The welfare gains of taking the channel into account
are found to be non negligible, yet a direct response to leverage is not of primary importance.
Nevertheless, these results do not rule out that an alternative instrument could perform better
at maximizing consumer welfare, an issue that deserves to be investigated in future work.
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Appendix A: Data description
Table 6: Data description: All variables are expressed in per-capita terms (divided by N). Hours are measured
as H1 ·H2/N where H1 is converted into an index. The nominal wage W1 is deflated by the GDP deflator. All
indexes are adjusted such that 2009 = 100. Civilian The estimation sample spans from 1983Q1 to 2007Q3.
symbol series mnemonic unit source
Y greal gross domestic product gdpc96 bn. usd fred / bea
P gdp deflator gdpdef index fred / bea
R effective federal funds rate fedfunds % fred / board of governors
C personal consumption expenditure pcec bn. usd fred / bea
I fixed private investment fpi bn. usd fred / bea
H1 civilian employment ce16ov thousands fred / bls
H2 nonfarm business (..) hours index prs85006023 department of labor
W1 nonfarm business (..) hourly compensation index prs85006103 department of labor
N civilian population ce16ov lns10000000 bls
q average weighted loan risk % board of governors
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Appendix B: Empirical motivation - recursive identification scheme
Figure 4: An expansionary monetary policy shock - Recursive identification scheme. Ex-ante q is
measured as the inverse of the average loan risk rating such that an decrease pertains to an increase in bank
ex-ante asset risk. The error bands shown correspond to a 68% confidence interval obtained by bootstrap.
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Appendix C: The full model - list of equations and estimation details
List of equations: We report here the equations that enter the non-linear model. Following
Smets and Wouters [2007] we assume (1) internal habits in consumption, (2) a utility function
that is non-separable in consumption and labor, U (ct, Lt) =
(ct ◆ct 1)1  c
1  c exp
L
1+ l
t
1+ l
, and (3)
that di↵erent varieties of intermediate goods and of labor are assembled through a Kimball
[1995] aggregator, rather than a Dixit-Stiglitz one. This latter assumption is introduced in order
to obtain estimates of price and wage rigidity that are closer to micro estimates.
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where ✏p = ⌘p/ (⌘p   1), ✏w = ⌘w/ (⌘w   1), kp =  10/✏p, kw =  10/✏w,  p = ✏p (1 + kp) / (✏p (1 + kp)  1)
and  p = ✏w (1 + kw) / (✏w (1 + kw)  1), and it is assumed that the Kimball aggregator’s cur-
vature is 10 for both goods and labor inputs.
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Observational equations and prior specifications:
The observation equations, linking the observed time series (left hand-side) to the variables in
the non-linear model (right hand-side) are the following:
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where H¯ are hours worked in 2009. Since there is no growth in the model, we estimate the
mean growth rates in the data µy and µl. The means of the inflation rate and of the nominal
interest rate in the data contain instead information used for the estimation of the steady-state
inflation rate and of the discount factor, which are assumed to follow a gamma prior distribution
respectively centered around 2.5% (annualised) and 0.99.
We fix parameters that are not indentified to values commonly used in the literature. In
particular, we choose a depreciation rate   of 0.025, a steady-state wage markup "¯W of 1.05, a
steady-state spending to GDP ratio gy of 18%, a weight of labor in the utility function L¯ such
34
that steady-state hours are equal to 1, and curvatures of the Kimball aggregator for goods and
labor varieties of 10.
For all structural shocks, we employ a non-informative uniform distribution, with lower bound
0 and upper bound of 1 or 10 depending on the scale of the shock. The persistences of the shock
processes are assumed to have a beta prior distribution centered at 0.5, and with standard
deviation of 0.2. Following Smets and Wouters [2007], we further assume that the two markup
shows have a moving average component.
The priors of the Taylor rule parameters are centered around very common values: the
smoothing parameter has a Beta distribution with a mean of 0.75, while the responses to inflation
and output are assumed to follow a Normal distribution with a mean of 1.5 and of 0.5/4 = 0.125.
The parameters a↵ecting price and wage stickiness have a beta distribution centered at 0.5
with standard deviation of 0.1. Our prior is that prices and wages are reoptimized on average
every 6 months, and that the degree of indexation to past inflation is only up to 50%. The
steady-state price markup is assumed to be centered around 1.25, slightly above the steady-state
wage markup.
We employ very common priors for all the parameters of the utility function. Habits are
centered around 0.7, the intertemporal elastity of substitution  c has a prior mean of 1.5, while
the elasticity of labor supply  l has a prior mean of 2. The capital share in production has a
prior mean of 0.3 while the investment adjustment costs parameter has a loose prior around 4.
The non-standard set of parameters are those pertaining to the banking sector. We center
the prior for the equity premium ⇠ to 1.5%, matching the average real excess returns of stocks
over the risk-free interest rate33. The recovery rate ✓ is set to 0.5. The means of the priors
for the parameters !2 (loan profitability) and  (deposit insurance) are jointly set to match
a steady-state annual default rate of 6%, an equity ratio of 10%. !2 is defined as a function
of the other bank parameters such that one unit of consumption good is expected to produce
one unit of capital good in steady state. The first two targets are roughly in line with empirical
values, the latter assumption makes sure the model is comparable with standard models of capital
accumulation.
Appendix D: Proof
The proof is by contradiction: Assume that there exists an equilibrium with no excess profits
where the bank would issue so little deposits that the promised repayment rd,t(1  kt) would be
lower than the cap on deposit insurance  1 kt . In this case the deposit rate rd,t would be equal
to the risk free rate Rt.
33A quarterly equity premium of 1.5% is compatible with the 6% historical annual equity premium found by
Mehra and Prescott [1985]. Similar values for the equity premium are furthermore obtained by computing the
excess return on bank equity over the risk-free interest rate.
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The first step maximization problem of the bank would then be
max
qt
qt!1r˜l,t   !2
2
r˜l,tqt   qtR˜t(1  kt)
and its solution
qˆt ⌘ qt(kt) = min max !1r˜l,t   R˜t(1  kt)
!2r˜l,t
, 0
!
, 1
!
The second step maximization problem would be
max
kt
V (k) = qˆ!1r˜l,t   !2
2
r˜l,tqˆ
2   qˆR˜t(1  k)  (⇠ + R˜t)k
If q is at a corner solution the objective function of the bank is decreasing in k, hence k=0
is optimal. Lets assume for now an interior solution for qˆt, Using the envelope theorem for the
first part of this expression it is easy to see that the first and second derivatives of the objective
function are
qˆtR˜t   (⇠ + R˜t)
and
R˜t
@qˆt
@kt
=
R˜2t
br˜l,t
> 0
The function is therefore convex with a single minimum. There can therefore be only a corner
solution for kt either at 0 or 1. But which corner? Assume kt = 1 is optimal. This is true i↵
V (1) > V (0) and qt(1) is interior. The latter holds i↵ !1 < !2. Comparing V (1) and V (0) it
is easy to show that the former can’t hold under this condition. Optimality with full insurance
therefore requires that the bank uses only deposits. This implies that any insurance cap smaller
than 100% would be exceeded by the deposit liabilities in case of default. Depositors are therefore
never fully insured.
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